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''S OME 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or
mental disabilities, and this number is increasing as the popu-
lation as a whole is growing older."' Congress placed this
statement in the preamble to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(the "ADA") to emphasis the magnitude of the problem it is seeking to
ameliorate-millions and millions of disabled persons are discriminated
against every single day. Thus, at the outset, Congress indicated that it
intends the scope of the ADA to be broad so that it will reach as many of
those millions as possible. 2 This breadth of coverage is necessary in order
to effectuate the purpose of the ADA, which is to end discrimination
against individuals with disabilities.
Congress enacted the ADA to prevent covered entities from discrimi-
nating against qualified individuals with "physical or mental impair-
ment[s]" that "substantially [limit] one or more of [a person's] major life
activities."'3 Prohibited acts include:
1. discriminating in regard to job application procedures,
2. the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees,
3. employee compensation,
4. employee job training, and
5. other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.4
Alcoholics, however, rarely fall within the broad scope of the ADA,
even though courts have recognized that alcoholism may qualify as a disa-
bility under the ADA.5 Alcoholism, like all potential impairments, is not
considered to be a per se disability under the act.6 This is because courts
1. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1)(1994).
2. See, e.g., Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 859 (1st Cir. 1997)(holding that mitigating measures should not be taken into account when evaluating
whether a person has a disability under the ADA).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994).
5. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lehman, 869 F.2d 253, 259 (4th Cir. 1989) (arguing that there
should be a framework to guide employers dealing with alcoholic employees and their
requests for reasonable accommodations).
6. See Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 316 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that the
alcoholic plaintiff failed to prove he was substantially limited in a major life activity.
2153
SMU LAW REVIEW
have agreed that the ADA requires an individualized determination of
each person's impairment.7 Thus, while alcoholism may "rise to the level
of a disability in some circumstances, it is insufficient for [a] plaintiff to
merely state that he is an alcoholic."' 8 Likewise, a court cannot assume
that all alcoholics are similarly and equally impacted.9
But there is an even bigger problem with evaluating alcoholism as a
disability for the purposes of the ADA. Although an alcoholic is recog-
nized by the ADA as someone who may be a "qualified individual with a
disability," 10 the burden an alcoholic must meet in order to establish his
prima facie case is far greater than that of other disabled persons because
the nature of the disability itself produces symptoms which employers are
allowed to discriminate against. This inconsistency arises because the
ADA allows employers to hold an alcoholic to the "same qualification
standards for employment or job performance and behavior that such en-
tity holds other employees, even if any unsatisfactory performance or be-
havior is related to the drug use or alcoholism of such employee.""
This comment explores the disparate treatment of alcoholism as a disa-
bility under Title I of the ADA, which prevents employers from discrimi-
nating against an employee because of an employee's disability. Part I of
this comment sets out Title I's statutory basis and focuses on the diver-
gent treatment of alcoholism under the ADA in federal case law. Part II
examines the controversy surrounding alcoholism and whether it should
qualify as a disability in the first place-because people make a choice
each and every time they drink. Finally, Part III discusses solutions for
establishing clear rules for deciding cases brought by alcoholics under the
ADA.
DISCUSSION
I. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF TITLE I OF THE ADA
A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE ADA
Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990, ex-
panding the scope of protection for persons with disabilities.' 2 The legis-
lation was prompted by the "continuing existence of unfair and
unnecessary discrimination and prejudice [which] denies people with dis-
abilities the opportunity to compete on an equal basis and to pursue
those opportunities for which free society is justifiably famous, and costs
7. See id. at 315-16.
8. See id. at 316.
9. See Goldsmith v. Jackson Mem'l Hosp. Pub. Health Trust, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1336,
1342 (S.D. Fl. 1998) (arguing that 'usual limitations' suffered by alcoholics do not necessa-
rily equate to 'substantial limitations').
10. See, e.g., Fuller v. Frank, 916 F.2d 558, 561 (9th Cir. 1990).
11. Id. (emphasis added).
12. The ADA was the second major act legislating the prohibition of employment dis-
crimination legislation. The first was the Rehabilitation Act, enacted in 1973 "to empower
individuals with disabilities to maximize employment, economic self-sufficiency, indepen-
dence, and inclusion and integration into society."' 29 U.S.C. § 701(b) (1994).
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the United States billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting
from dependency and non-productivity. 1 3
B. COVERED ENTITIES AND POSSIBLE RECOVERY UNDER THE ADA
Title I of the ADA covers the actions of private employers, employ-
ment agencies, labor unions, and joint labor management committees. 14
Under the Act, those covered entities are required to refrain from dis-
criminating against qualified individuals with "disabilities," as defined by
the ADA. 15
The ADA empowers employees and job applicants to bring action
against private employers who discriminate 16 against disabled individuals
who are "otherwise qualified.' 7 Under Title I of the ADA, injured par-
ties may recover both monetary damages and equitable relief.18 Addi-
tionally, a successful plaintiff may recover both compensatory and
punitive damages for intentional employment discrimination. 19 While Ti-
tle I does not preempt federal, state, or local laws that provide greater or
equal protection for persons with disabilities,20 it does preempt laws that
provide less protection. 21
C. DEFINITION OF "DISABILITY" UNDER THE ADA
The ADA defines "disability" with respect to an individual as "(A) a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities of such individual;22 (B) a record of such an impair-
ment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment. '23 For the
purposes of the ADA, an individual is only disabled if he is restricted
from performing a "class or a broad range of jobs in various classes" and
13. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(9) (1994).
14. But the scope of Title I is limited in that only those entities with fifteen employees
or more are "covered entities" under the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(A) (1994).
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) (1994).
16. See Ellenwood v. Exxon Shipping Co., 984 F.2d 1270,1277 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding
that the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act do not preclude the availability of additional
state or federal remedies).
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (1994).
18. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)2 (1994); see, e.g., Dutton v. Johnson County Bd. of County
Comm'rs, 868 F. Supp. 1260, 1263-65 (D. Kan. 1994) (awarding both back pay and job
reinstatement to public works equipment operator after firing for excessive absences due
to disability).
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994); But see 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (1994) (capping ag-
gregate compensation awards, dependant upon the size of the employer). For companies
with 15-100 employees, the cap is $50,000, for those with 101-200 employees, the cap is
$200,000, and for those with over 500 employees, the cap is $300,000.
20. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c)(2) (1994).
21. See id.
22. "Physical or mental impairment" means "[a]ny physiological disorder, or condition
... affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, ....
hemic and lymphatic,.., and endocrine; or[a]ny mental or psychological disorder, such as
... emotional or mental illness .. " 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1996).
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(a)-(c) (1994). The touchstone for determining activity's
inclusion as a "major life activity" under the ADA is its significance. See Abbott v. Brag-
don, 107 F.3d 934, 941 (1st Cir. 1994).
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not merely the particular job that his suit focuses on.24
1. Impairment in a Major Life Activity
Whether or not an impairment is disabling focuses on whether it im-
pairs or is perceived by the employer to impair the individual in a "major
life activity."'2 5 Major life activities are "functions such as caring for one-
self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breath-
ing, learning, and working, those basic activities that the average person
in the general population can perform with little or no difficulty: includ-
ing sitting, standing, lifting, [and] reaching. ' 26 In order for an impairment
to be considered substantially limiting, the impairment must be "a signifi-
cant restriction on the major life activity." '2 7
Congress created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(the "EEOC") to monitor the enforcement of the ADA and promulgate
regulations and guidelines regarding the ADA. The EEOC clarifies sub-
stantially limiting impairments as follows:
[A]n impairment is substantially limiting if it significantly restricts
the duration, manner, or condition under which an individual can
perform a major life activity as compared to the average person in
the general population's ability to perform that same major life activ-
ity. Thus, for example, an individual who, because of an impairment,
can only walk for very brief periods of time would be substantially
limited in the major life activity of walking. An individual who uses
artificial legs would likewise be substantially limited in the major life
activity of walking because the individual is unable to walk without
the aid of prosthetic devices.28
a. The Difficulty in Proving Substantial Limitation
The Fifth Circuit case, Burch v. Coca-Cola Co.,2 9 illustrates how diffi-
cult it can be for an alcoholic plaintiff to carry his burden of proof on the
first method of proving a disability under the ADA-showing that he has
a "substantially limiting" impairment. In Burch, the alcoholic plaintiff at-
tended a company dinner meeting, became intoxicated, and mouthed an
obscenity to a fellow manager.30 Afterward, the plaintiff voluntarily ad-
mitted himself to a ten-day inpatient program followed by a four-week
outpatient program.31 The employer fired him two days before his ex-
pected release to full-time work, citing his inappropriate behavior at the
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (1994). See also Goldsmith, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 1340
(holding that a plaintiff who could not perform the duties of a clinic physician because of
his hand tremors was not necessarily prevented from performing a broad range of jobs).
25. See 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(k) (1996).
26. 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(i) (1996).
27. Taylor v. Pheonixville Sch. Dist., 998 F. Supp. 561, 556 (E.D. Pa. 1998), rev'd on
other grounds, 184 F.3d 296 (3rd Cir. 1999).
28. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (1996).
29. 119 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 1997).
30. See id. at 311.
31. See id. at 312.
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dinner party as the reason for his termination.32 The trial court found in
favor of the plaintiff, and the employer appealed the judgment.33
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision,
holding that (1) alcoholism is not a per se disability, and (2) the plaintiff
failed to prove that his alcoholism caused him to be substantially limited
in a major life activity.34 The plaintiff in Burch alleged that when he
"drank too much," he was limited in his ability to walk, talk, think, and
sleep 35 and that the accompanying hangovers affected his memory, but
the Court of Appeals characterized his symptoms as temporarily incapaci-
tating.36 The Fifth Circuit argued that "[p]ermanency, not frequency, is
the touchstone of a substantially limiting impairment. '37 The court con-
sidered it important that the plaintiff "produced no evidence that the ef-
fects of his alcoholism-induced inebriation were qualitatively different
than those achieved by an overindulging social drinker. ' 38 The court fur-
ther noted that although the plaintiff's alcoholism may be "permanent,"
he presented "no evidence that he suffered from [a] substantially limiting
impairment of any significant duration. '39
The court in Burch made no attempt to draw a distinction between an
alcoholic and an overindulgent social drinker, nor did it specify what sort
of impairments would have qualified. Had the plaintiff shown that his
ability to walk, think, talk, and sleep were permanently impaired, as the
court apparently would have required, he surely would not have been
able to perform the essential functions of his job and would not have
been a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA in the first
place.40
2. Record of a Substantially Limiting Impairment
The second method available to a plaintiff proving his prima facie case
is to establish his disability by showing that he has a record of impair-
ment. In order to meet this second prong of the ADA disability defini-
tion, the plaintiff "must demonstrate 'a history of, or [be] misclassified as
having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or
more of his major life activities.'"41
Numerous plaintiffs have attempted to satisfy this prong of the disabil-
ity definition of the ADA by asserting that a record of impairment has
32. See id. at 311.
33. See Burch, 119 F.3d at 305.
34. See id. at 325.
35. These are examples of major life activities as defined by the EEOC.
36. See id. at 316.
37. Id. at 316.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. The ADA requires that the plaintiff establish that he can perform the essential
functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodation, in order to be qualified.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994).
41. Wilson v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., No.98-3411, 1999 WL 58657, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Jan.
26, 1999) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) (emphasis added).
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been shown per se if the plaintiff has been hospitalized and the defendant
has knowledge of it.42 In Bilodeau v. Mega Industries,43 the court dis-
cussed its agreement with the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits that "a
hospitalization for an impairment does not in and of itself establish a re-
cord of such a disability. '44 This reasoning is supported by the ADA's
requirement that there must be more than a record of a disability, the
record must be of a disability that substantially impairs the plaintiff in a
major life activity. 45
3. Regarded as Having a Disability
The third method a plaintiff may use to establish that he suffers from a
disability under the ADA is to show that he is regarded as having an
impairment that substantially limits him in one or more major life activi-
ties.46 "To be 'regarded as having a disability,' [the] plaintiff must be per-
ceived by [the] defendant as generally unable to work in either a class of
jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared with the
average person having comparable training, skills and abilities." 47 Thus,
a plaintiff can be disabled under the ADA even if he is not substantially
impaired in a major life activity, as long as others regard him as such.48
But the plaintiff cannot merely demonstrate that "the employer regarded
[him] as somehow disabled; rather, the plaintiff must show that the em-
ployer regarded [him] as disabled within the meaning of the ADA. '49
Even if the defendant concedes that the plaintiff has an impairment, the
plaintiff still bears the burden of proof to further prove that the defen-
dant perceived his impairment to be one that substantially limited him in
a major life activity. 50 Just because the employer is aware of the em-
ployee's disability does not mean the employer regarded the employee as
disabled or that the adverse employment action was taken because of the
perception. 5'
The EEOC has promulgated regulations defining under what circum-
stances an individual is "regarded as" having an impairment. These cir-
cumstances include employers who view an employee as one who: (1) has
a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit life ac-
tivities but is treated by a covered entity as constituting such limitations,
(2) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life
42. See, e.g., Bilodeau v. Mega Indus. 50 F. Supp. 2d 27, 36-37 (D. Me. 1999) (holding
that plaintiff could not simply introduce evidence of hospitalization to establish that she
had a record of impairment).
43. 50 F. Supp. 2d 27, 36-37 (D. Me. 1999).
44. See id. at 38.
45. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) (1996). See also Burch, 119 F.3d at 321.
46. See 42 U.S.C. §12102(2)(C) (1994).
47. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1996).
48. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1) (1996).
49. See Roberts v. N.Y. State Dep't. Of Corr. Serv., 63 F. Supp. 2d 272, 289 (W.D.N.Y.
1999)
50. See Wilson, 1999 WL 58657, at *5 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
51. See id.
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activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impair-
ment; or (3) has none of the impairments defined by the EEOC regula-
tions but is treated by a covered entity as having a substantially limiting
impairment.5 2
a. The Difficulty in Satisfying the "Regarded As" Prong
The case of Wilson v. International Board. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
and Warehousemen,53 illustrates a plaintiff's failure to prove his disability
under the "regarded as" prong of the ADA. The plaintiff, Wilson, was a
personal assistant and chauffeur who shared an apartment with his em-
ployer during the week. 54 Wilson regularly drank alcohol with his em-
ployer after working hours.55 He was fired by his employer and
subsequently filed suit, alleging that the employer regarded his alcohol-
ism as substantially impairing the plaintiff in the major life activity of
working.56 The employer knew Wilson was an alcoholic and reprimanded
him on many occasions for problems associated with his drinking.57 But
the employer introduced evidence sufficient to establish that he did not
perceive the alcoholism as "substantially limiting" in the major life activ-
ity of working-even as a chauffeur. The court thus held that the plain-
tiff failed to establish his disability through the "regarded as" prong of
the ADA.58
This decision appears problematic for two reasons. First, the employer
repeatedly reprimand the plaintiff for his drinking, indicating that he per-
ceived Wilson's alcoholism as interfering with his work. Second, the
plaintiff was a chauffeur whose job was to drive his employer from place
to place, yet the court readily accepted the employer's assertion that he
did not believe the plaintiff's alcoholism substantially impaired his ability
to work-in this case, to drive a vehicle. The holding in this case appears
to be result-oriented. Perhaps the court could not reconcile the plaintiff's
choice to drink with his choice of profession and therefore, reasoned that
he was not disabled within the meaning of the ADA.
D. THE PROCESS OF BRINGING A DISCRIMINATION CLAIM
UNDER THE ADA
1. Establishing a Disability under the ADA
The ADA provides a framework for all plaintiffs suing under the stat-
ute. The first step a plaintiff must take when bringing an action against
an employer is to establish that: (1) he is a qualified individual with a
52. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1) (1996).
53. 47 F. Supp. 2d 8 (D. Col. 1999).
54. See id.
55. Id. at 9.
56. See id. at 8.
57. See Wilson, 47 F.Supp. 2d at 9.
58. See id. at 11.
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disability,59 and (2) the employer's adverse employment action was taken
"because of [his] disability. ' 60 The ADA defines a "qualified individual"
as one who (1) satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education, and
other job-related requirements of the employment position, and (2) can
perform the essential functions of the position, with or without reasona-
ble accommodation.6' Reasonable accommodations and essential func-
tions will be discussed separately.
2. Direct Evidence Method and the McDonnell Douglas Indirect
Evidence Method
A plaintiff bears the burden of proving that he is an otherwise qualified
person with a disability under the ADA. A plaintiff may meet this bur-
den using either of two separate methods in order to satisfy his prima
facie case of discrimination as prescribed by the ADA. First, the plaintiff
can introduce direct evidence of discrimination on the part of the em-
ployer. 62 Second, the plaintiff may use indirect evidence, utilizing the
method of proof established for Title VII actions in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green.63
Direct evidence could include blatant acknowledgments on the em-
ployer's part, such as admitting that the individual is not being hired or is
being demoted because he or she is an alcoholic. If the plaintiff cannot
establish his prima facie case through direct evidence, then he must resort
to the McDonnell Douglas method.
There are four prongs to satisfying a plaintiff's burdens of proof under
the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. First, the plaintiff
must show that he is disabled as the term is defined in the ADA. Second,
he must demonstrate that he is qualified for the position he seeks, with or
without reasonable accommodation. Third, he must prove that he was
subject to an adverse employment action. Fourth, he must establish that
a non-disabled person replaced him, or that he was treated less favorably
than non-disabled employees were.64
Once the plaintiffs has established his prima facie case of discrimina-
tion against the employer, the burden of production shifts to the em-
ployer, who must then articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
for taking the adverse employment action. 65 It is important to note that
the employer's burden at this time is not one of proof, but of produc-
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 1212(a) (1994).
60. Id.
61. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (1996).
62. See, e.g. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07 (1993).
63. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
64. See id. (holding that to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination under
Title VII, a plaintiff must show "(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied
and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that despite
his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained
open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's
qualifications").
65. See Tex. Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
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tion.66 In St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,67 the United States Supreme
Court explained the difference between proof and production. The Court
held that although the McDonnell Douglas presumption shifts the burden
of production to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discrimina-
tory reason for the adverse employment action, "[t]he ultimate burden of
persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated
against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff. '68 The em-
ployer's burden of production is minimal. The employer has to produce
only evidence sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable trier of fact
that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the adverse employ-
ment action. 69
Finally, the burden shifts back to the plaintiffs, who must demonstrate
that the employer's proffered reason is pretextual and that the real reason
for his termination is that the employer discriminated against him because
of his disability.70 There are three ways a plaintiff can establish that an
employer's proffered reason is pretextual. First, the plaintiff can show
that the employer's purported reasoning had no basis in fact. Second, he
can prove that the employer's reason was not that which actually moti-
vated the employer's action. Third, the plaintiff can show that the em-
ployer's proffered reason(s) were insufficient to motivate the employer's
action. 71
If the plaintiff produces direct evidence that the employer's proffered
reason is pretextual, then, and only then, does the burden of proof shift to
the employer to show that the action was not taken because of the plain-
tiff's disability.72 The plaintiff may accomplish this by tendering words or
writing(s) by the employer that evidence a discriminatory motive on the
employer's part. 73 Ultimately, a plaintiff must establish by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the employer's adverse employment actions
were taken because of the employee's disability.74
In most discrimination cases "the issue [of whether an employer's prof-
fered reason is pretextual] is a factual question of motivation: Could a
reasonable jury find that the adverse action was taken because of the
employee's disability rather than because of the purported nondiscrimi-
natory reason?" 75 If the answer to this question is yes, then the judge
must allow the case to get to the jury.76 As the court in Stepanischen v.
66. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 506.
67. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
68. Id. at 506 (emphasis added).
69. See id.
70. See Daigle v. Liberty Life Ins. Co, 70 F.3d 394, 396 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that it
is clear that the Title VII McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework applies in ADA
cases).
71. See Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 883 (6th Cir. 1996).
72. See Brown v. E. Miss. Elec. Power Ass'n., 989 F.2d 858, 861 (5th Cir. 1989).
73. See id.
74. See St. Mary's Honor Cntr., 509 U.S. at 507.




Merchants Despatch Transp. Corp.77 noted, courts have to be "particu-
larly cautious" about granting an employer's motion for summary
judgment.78
a. The Difficulty Faced by Alcoholics in Establishing that the
Employer's Proffered Reason is Pretextual
Murphy v. Village of Hoffman Estates79 illustrates a plaintiff's failed
efforts to establish that his employer's motive for terminating him was
pretextual. The plaintiff's employer brought disciplinary action against
the plaintiff, Murphy, on a number of occasions.80 Murphy's employer
eventually terminated him as a result of the numerous alleged infrac-
tions. 81 Murphy argued that the numerous occasions of disciplinary ac-
tion, and indeed, his ultimate termination, was all a pretext for
discrimination on the part of his employer.82 Murphy proffered evidence
that his employer had a policy of expunging disciplinary records every
twelve months but that the employer failed to follow this policy with re-
gards to Murphy's record.83 The court refused, however, to consider this
as evidence of pretext, because the employer's policy was only to expunge
employee's records if they avoided disciplinary incidents for at least
twelve months, and there was evidence that Murphy had not done SO. 8 4
Maddox v. University of Tennessee.85 is another example of a case
where the plaintiff unsuccessfully tried to prove that the defendant termi-
nated him because he was an alcoholic, rather than for the allegedly legit-
imate reasons proffered. 86 The plaintiff, Maddox, introduced evidence
that while he was undergoing rehabilitative treatment, he met with the
athletic trainer 87 and that the trainer told him that "he had been advised"
that one of the directors "did not want another alcoholic in the pro-
gram."' 88 The court held that the evidence was inadmissible as double
hearsay-thus the plaintiff was effectively prevented from establishing
that the defendant's proffered reasons for termination were pretextual.89
If the plaintiff establishes his prima facie case and the burden-shifting
analysis is completed, the employer may raise certain affirmative de-
fenses to the plaintiff's discrimination claim. Affirmative defenses will be
discussed separately.
77. 722 F.2d 922 (lst Cir. 1983).
78. See id. at 928.
79. Murphy, No. 95CJ192, 1999 WL 160305 (N.D. Il. March 17, 1999).
80. See id. at 3.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 5.
83. Murphy, 1999 WL 160305 at *5.
84. See id.
85. 907 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Tenn. 1994).
86. See id. Note that Maddox was a case brought under the Rehabilitation Act, but the
method used to show that a defendant's proffered reasons were pretextual is the same
under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.
87. The athletic trainer was unavailable because he died before the trial.
88. See id. at 1148. (emphasis added).
89. See id. at 1152.
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E. ALCOHOLISM AS A DISABILITY UNDER THE ADA
Each time a plaintiff files suit under the ADA, the court must make an
individual determination as to whether the plaintiff has produced enough
evidence that a reasonable jury could find that he is a qualified individual
with a disability under the ADA.90 As mentioned earlier, under the
ADA, employers may hold alcoholics and drug users to the same job per-
formance standards as other non-disabled employees. 91 The plaintiff
bears the "burden of proving that his alcoholism did not affect his job and
that he was performing to the same standard as other employees. '92 This
means that even if the alcoholism was a causal factor leading to improper
behavior or non-compliance with company standards, the alcoholic per-
son gets no special privileges. The following two cases illustrate this
point.
1. Rollison v. Gwinnet County
The first case illustrating this standard is Rollison v. Gwinnet County.93
In Rollison, the plaintiff police officer's employer deemed the plaintiff's
performance "average to good and sometimes going to excellent. '94 But
his off-duty behavior was not acceptable and included "repeated involve-
ment in fights, domestic altercations, [and a] traffic violation. '95 These
behaviors fell below the standards that the county required of its police
officers. 96 The court held that "the facts of [Rollison] fell squarely within
the ADA's treatment of alcoholic employees who do not perform up to
the standards required by their employer" and denied the plaintiff recov-
ery under the Act.97 The court applied this harsh result even though the
plaintiff was not accused of drinking or being under the influence of alco-
hol on the job, and even though his off-duty indiscretions were causally
related to his alcoholism. 98 Thus, although there was a causal connection
between the plaintiff's behavior and his disability, the court did not view
the county's action as one of discrimination.
90. See Bilodeau, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 47.
91. See 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(4) (1994). See also Altman v. New York City Health and
Hosps., Corp. 100 F.3d 1054, 1059 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that plaintiff chief of internal
medicine was guilty of being under the influence of alcohol on the job).
92. Conley v. Vill. of Bedford Park, 1999 WL 412441, *3 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (holding that
the plaintiff, who had repeatedly turned down overtime work and admitted others with less
seniority deserved to be promoted over him because of better performance ratings, had not
carried his burden).
93. See 865 F. Supp. 1564, 1572 (N.D. Ga. 1994).




98. A covered entity may hold an employee who is an alcoholic to the same standards
that it holds other employees even if the unsatisfactory performance or behavior is related to
the alcoholism of the employee. See 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(4) (emphasis added).
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2. Despears v. Milwaukee County
The Seventh Circuit case Despears v. Milwaukee9 9 further illustrates
this point. The plaintiff in Despears, an alcoholic, was required to have a
driver's license for his job. He was arrested and convicted for driving
under the influence of alcohol.10 0 Because having a driver's license was a
prerequisite for his position, his employer demoted him to a position
where a license was not required. 10 1
The plaintiff brought an ADA action against his employer alleging that
the employer had a discriminatory motive in demoting him, but he could
not even get past the summary judgment stage. 02 He argued that his
disability (alcoholism) caused him to drink. Then, once he was drinking,
his judgment was impaired, and his impaired judgment caused him to
drive while intoxicated. Thus, it was this pattern of behavior, caused by
his alcoholism, which subsequently caused him to lose his license. 0 3
From the plaintiff's perspective, his alcoholism was ultimately the reason
for his demotion.10 4 In analyzing the plaintiff's case, however, the Sev-
enth Circuit rejected the plaintiff's argument, explaining that "criminal
law proceeds on the premise that even alcoholics can avoid driving while
[intoxicated]."' 1 5 The court argued that the plaintiff made a conscious
choice to drive his automobile while under the influence of alcohol. 10 6
As the court explained, alcoholism was merely one factor in his decision
to drive while intoxicated. 0 7 In the eyes of the court, the plaintiff's
choice to drink and his subsequent choice to drive deserved greater
weight than his addiction. 0 8 The court stated that the plaintiff's disability
"contributed to, but did not compel the action that resulted in [his]
demotion. 10 9
The Despears court also identified the slippery slope that would be cre-
ated if courts were to require employers to sanction criminal behavior.
The court reasoned that using the ADA to impose liability against em-
ployers in "such circumstances would indirectly but unmistakably under-
mine the laws that regulate dangerous behavior," because it would give
alcoholics and others with disabilities special privileges allowing them "to
avoid some of the normal sanctions for criminal activity." 1' 0 The court
feared that doing so would communicate the message that, just because it
is more difficult for an alcoholic to choose not to drive while intoxicated
than it is for non-alcoholics, the sanctions should be lightened for
99. 63 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 1995).
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 635-36.
103. See id. at 636.
104. See Despears, 63 F.3d at 636.
105. Id. at 637.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 636.
108. See id.
109. 63 F.3d at 637.
110. Id.
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them.111 They would be allowed to "keep [their] jobs in circumstances
where anyone else engaged in the same criminal behavior would lose
it."11a2 This argument is faulty, however, because the plaintiff was not ar-
guing that he should not be held criminally liable for driving under the
influence of alcohol, he was arguing that his employer should not be able
to take action against him when his disability led to his behavior. The
Seventh Circuit's analysis concluded that "the refusal to excuse, or even
alleviate the punishment of, the disabled person who commits a crime
under the influence is not "discrimination against the disabled; it is a re-
fusal to discriminate in their favor.'1 13
The EEOC regulations apply equivalent standards to employees dis-
abled by alcoholism and to non-disabled employees. Further, the regula-
tions restrict who may be considered disabled under the ADA because of
drug addiction or alcoholism. Those engaging in current illegal drug use
are not considered disabled under the ADA,114 but those who have suc-
cessfully completed or are currently participating in a supervised drug
rehabilitation program and are no longer engaging in such use are dis-
abled. 115 On the other hand, the EEOC treats addictions to illegal drugs
and addictions to alcohol differently. There is no requirement that the
alcoholic currently be abstaining from the use of alcohol to be covered
under the ADA.116 Employers may, however, prohibit the use of illegal
use of drugs and alcohol in the workplace 1 7 and prohibit employees from
being under the influence of illegal drugs or alcohol in the workplace. 118
F. WHEN IS AN ALCOHOLIC "OTHERWISE QUALIFIED"
UNDER THE ADA?
An employee must show that he is a disabled person who is otherwise
qualified to perform the job "with or without reasonable accommoda-
tion" before he has standing to file suit under the ADA. Discrimination
under the ADA includes failing to reasonably accommodate the known
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a
disability who is an applicant or employee.1 19 The ADA defines an "oth-
erwise qualified," individual as one who is able to perform the essential
functions of the position with or without reasonable accommodations.1 20
The court must perform individual assessments as to what functions are
deemed essential on a case-by-case basis.' 21 Evidence of which functions




114. See id. at § 12114(a) (1994).
115. See id. at § 12114(b)(1),(2) (1994).
116. See id.
117. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.16(b)(1) (1996).
118. See id. at § 1630.16(b)(2).
119. See 42 U.S.C § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994).
120. See id.
121. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (1996).
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1. the employer's judgment as to which functions are essential,
2. written job descriptions of the position,
3. the amount of time spent on the function,
4. the consequences of not requiring the disabled individual to per-
form the function,
5. the terms of a collective bargaining agreement,
6. the work experience of past persons in the same position, and/ or
7. the current work experience of other persons in the same
position. 122
Other factors may apply if a particular function is a specialized ability.
Then the court should consider (1) whether the position exists mostly to
perform that function, (2) whether there is a limited pool of employees
available to perform that function, and (3) whether the function is highly
specialized and the incumbent is hired specifically for his expertise. 123
When bringing an action under the ADA, the plaintiff "cannot simply
allege that he 'could' have performed the essential functions of his
job. '124 Instead, the plaintiff must "allege that, at the time he was termi-
nated, he was meeting his employer's legitimate performance
expectations. 125
G. EMPLOYER'S DUTY TO PROVIDE REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS
The ADA requires employers to make "reasonable accommodations to
the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified indi-
vidual with a disability.' 126 A reasonable accommodation is one that
would allow a person with a disability to perform the essential functions
of the position. 27 Accommodations may include, but are not limited to:
1. making existing facilities readily usable by the disabled individual,
2. job restructuring,
3. part-time or modified work schedules,
4. reassignment to a vacant position,
5. acquisition or modification of equipment, and
6. other similar accommodations. 128
Failure to provide reasonable accommodations to persons with known
disabilities is prima facie evidence of discrimination. 129 But this standard
is not as harsh as it sounds. In Taylor v. Principle Financial Group,
Inc.,' 30 the Fifth Circuit held that the disabled plaintiff must show he
122. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3) (1996).
123. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2) (1996).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994).
127. See Rizzo v. Children's World Learning Cntrs., Inc., 84 F.3d 758, 762 (5th Cir.
1996).
128. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1994). See, e.g., H. Rep. No. 101-485, 84, U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 1990, p.45 1 (Part-time or modified work schedules are accommodations
intended for people with disabilities who cannot work a standard or customary schedule).
129. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994).
130. 93 F.3d 155 (5th Cir. 1996).
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made a request for reasonable accommodation. 131 After the employee
requests accommodation, the employer must make a reasonable effort to
provide the appropriate accommodation to qualified individuals with dis-
abilities.132 Then the employer should use a problem-solving approach,
working with the employee, to implement appropriate accommoda-
tions. 133 But the individual must first demonstrate that he is substantially
impaired in a "major life activity" 134 at the time the accommodation is
sought before the ADA will require the employer to make any such ac-
commodation to the individual. 135
1. What is a "Reasonable" Accommodation?
The ADA specifically defines the criteria for what qualifies as a reason-
able accommodation. Accommodations are not considered reasonable if
they would (1) eliminate an essential function of the position, (2) impose
an undue burden on the employer, or (3) pose a direct threat to the
health and safety of others.136 Whether the employer has provided rea-
sonable accommodation is generally a question of fact, and the employer
bears the burden of proving its inability to accommodate. 137
a. Elimination of an Essential Function is Not Reasonable
First, the ADA states that any accommodation which would require the
employer to eliminate an essential function of the position is not reasona-
ble under the ADA. 138 In Barber v. Nabors Drilling, U.S.A., Inc.,'139 the
Fifth Circuit held that individuals are not considered "otherwise quali-
fied" under the ADA if the only successful accommodation is for the dis-
abled person not to perform an essential function of the job. 140
b. It is Not Reasonable to Impose an Undue Hardship on the
Employer
Second, the ADA provides that an accommodation is not reasonable if
it would impose an "undue hardship" on the employer.' 4' The ADA de-
fines "undue hardship" as any action "requiring significant difficulty or
expense" in light of such considerations as the cost involved and the diffi-
131. See id. at 163-64.
132. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9 (1995) (emphasis added).
133. See id.
134. Major life activities include "those basic activities that the average person in the
general population can perform with little or no difficulty." See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(I) (dis-
cussing which activities qualify as major life activities under the ADA).
135. See Burch, 119 F.3d at 315.
136. See Robertson, 161 F.3d at 295-96.
137. See, e.g., Fuller, 916 F.2d at 562, n.6; Schmidt v. Safeway Inc., 864 F. Supp. 991, 997
(D. Or. 1994).
138. See Robertson,161 F.3d at 295.
139. 130 F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 1997).
140. See id. at 709.
141. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(a) (1994).
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culty of implementing the accommodation. 142 An employer may affirma-
tively defend a lawsuit under the ADA by showing that his business
would be put under undue hardship if he were required to accommodate
the employee in the manner suggested. 143 But because the employer
bears the burden on this issue, it must be able to demonstrate that the
accommodation would cause a negative economic impact on the company
or disrupt the company's operations. 144
c. It is Not Reasonable to Pose a Direct Threat to the Health or
Safety of Others in the Workplace
Third, employers are not required to accommodate employees if doing
so would pose a direct threat to the health or safety of others in the work-
place. 145 The EEOC defines "direct threat" as a significant risk of sub-
stantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that
cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation. 146
Courts examining whether an employee poses a direct threat should look
at the individual's present ability to safely perform the essential functions
of the job. 14 7 In making this determination, courts should consider a
number of factors, including:
1. the duration of the risk,
2. the nature and severity of the potential harm,
3. the likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and
4. the imminence of the potential harm. 148
This concept is illustrated in Altman v. New York Health and Hosp.
Corp.14 9 In Altman, the plaintiff, physician Kurt Altman, was Chief of
Internal Medicine at Metropolitan Hospital Center. 50 While working at
Metropolitan, he had been cited for professional misconduct, including
drinking alcohol in the workplace and being under the influence of alco-
hol while working. 51 Subsequently, Altman successfully completed a su-
pervised inpatient rehabilitation program. 152 Metropolitan did not want
Altman to return to his position because the Chief of Internal Medicine
was required to be on-call 24 hours a day, and the hospital feared that he
142. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A) (1994).
143. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994).
144. See Riel v. Elec. Data Sys., 99 F.3d 678, 682 (5th Cir. 1996).
145. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (1994).
146. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1997).
147. See id.; See also Rizzo, 84 F.3d at 763.
148. See C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1997).
149. See 100 F.3d 1054, 1061 (2nd Cir. 1996) (holding that alcoholic physician with his-
tory of on-the job drinking and absenteeism was not qualified to serve as hospital's chief of
internal medicine).
150. See id. at 1055.
151. See id. The medical director at the hospital discovered Altman treating a patient
while inebriated. See id.
152. See id. at 1055-56. Altman's treating physician at the detoxification center released
him with a guarded prognosis, citing his continued alcoholism, underestimation of his dis-
ease, and control issues. See id. at 1056.
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would relapse. 153 Thus, if Altman did relapse and was called in to work,
there might be a repeated incident of drinking on the job, even treating
patients while intoxicated. Engaging in such behavior would certainly
pose a direct threat to the health and safety of others in the workplace.
As a proposed reasonable accommodation, Metropolitan told Altman
that he could return to the hospital as an attending physician.154 His sal-
ary in the position would be $40,000 less than his salary as chief of
medicine, but $10,000 more than other staff physicians were being
paid. 155 Altman objected to the accommodation, claiming that it was not
an equivalent position, in status or in salary.1 56 But both the district court
and the Second Circuit court of appeals agreed with Metropolitan that
the proposed accommodation was reasonable.' 57
The problem with the analysis employed by the two courts, however, is
that everyone, Metropolitan, the district court, and the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals all agreed that it would be a reasonable accommoda-
tion to allow Altman to return to work as an attending physician, 158
working with patients. If the reason that Altman could not return to work
as chief of internal medicine was that there was a possibility of relapse,
then how did it make sense for him to return to treating patients at all? 159
And why, if he would be doing the same work as other attending physi-
cians, would he be making $10,000 more? Again, it appears that the
court was engaging in result-oriented analysis. Perhaps the hospital
feared that leaving Altman in such a prominent position with his history
of alcoholism would leave it open to lawsuits, and the court did not want
to punish Metropolitan for choosing to keep Altman, but merely placing
him in a less conspicuous position. But there is no place in the ADA for
such reasoning. Altman either does or does not pose a direct threat to
the patients, and he would be working with patients in either the Chief of
Internal Medicine position or the staff physician position. The only real
differences would be the salary and the title.
H. WHAT QUALIFIES AS REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION FOR THE
ALCOHOLIC EMPLOYEE?
The following sections illustrate some of the difficulties alcoholics have
in establishing that they are "otherwise qualified" for the job, "with or
without reasonable accommodations" under the ADA.16° Alcoholism is
treated differently than other disabilities in many ways. Alcoholics bring-
153. See Altman, 100 F.3d at 1056.
154. See id. at 1059.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 1058.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See id. The court included other factors, such as the great number of people Alt-
man would be in charge of as chief of internal medicine. See id. at 1057-1058.
160. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994) (requiring that individuals prove that they can




ing a discrimination claim under the ADA have a greater burden than
those with other disabilities do. It is extremely difficult for alcoholics to
establish (1) that they have a substantially limiting impairment' 6' and (2)
that they are "otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of
the position.' 162 The difficulty lays in the paradox involved in the ADA
allowing employers (1) to hold alcoholics to the same standards as other
employees, 163 and (2) to discharge alcoholics for below-standard behav-
ior, 164 even if such behavior is causally related to the alcoholism. 165
1. Providing a Framework for Reasonable Accommodation: Rogers v.
Lehman
The Fourth Circuit case, Rogers v. Lehman,166 provided a framework
for analyzing the question, "What is a reasonable accommodation of an
alcoholic employee?"' 167 In Rogers, the court examined two consolidated
cases. Two alcoholic employees sued the Army and the Navy, respec-
tively, alleging that their employers failed to reasonably accommodate
them. 168 The first plaintiff was discharged for alcohol related absentee-
ism. 169 The second plaintiff was discharged both for alcohol-related ab-
senteeism and for drinking on the job,170 clearly proscribed under the
ADA. 171 Each plaintiff had already completed supervised outpatient re-
habilitation programs. 72
The Rogers court held that, when dealing with an alcoholic employee,
the employer must follow a progressive course of action. 73 The em-
ployer should:
1. inform the employee of available counseling services as soon as a
problem is recognized,
2. provide the employee with a firm choice between treatment and
discipline,
3. provide an opportunity for outpatient treatment, with discipline
for continued misconduct; and
4. afford an opportunity for inpatient treatment if outpatient treat-
ment fails. 174
If the employer discharges an employee after inpatient treatment fails,
then there is a rebuttable presumption that the employer's action was
161. See, e.g., Burch, 119 F.3d at 315.
162. See 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(4) (allowing employers to hold alcoholics to the same




166. 869 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1989).
167. See id.
168. See id. at 254, 256-57.
169. See id. at 255-57.
170. See Rogers, 869 F.2d at 255-57.
171. See 49 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(1).
172. See Rogers, 869 F.2d at 255-56.
173. See id. at 259.
174. See id.
2170 [Vol. 54
ALCOHOLISM AND THE ADA
justified under the ADA. 175 Furthermore, the plaintiff may succeed in
rebutting this presumption only in "rare case[s] such as where a recover-
ing alcoholic had a single relapse after a long period of abstinence.' ' 176
The court examined the actions of the two employers and determined
that because the Army and Navy did not allow each plaintiff the opportu-
nity for inpatient treatment before discharge, 177 they denied the employ-
ees reasonable accommodations. 78 The court then reinstated both
plaintiffs to their former positions. 179
The Fourth Circuit ruling in Rogers appears to conflict with the Fifth
Circuit's holding in Burch,180 where the plaintiff was terminated while
participating in his first rehabilitation program. 181 It might be possible to
reconcile the two cases if one categorizes the plaintiff's conduct in Burch,
mouthing an obscenity to a fellow employee, 182 as crossing the line to
egregious behavior. The more logical assumption, however, is that the
two Circuits differ in where their sympathies lie: with the employee or the
employer.
The Fourth Circuit's framework for providing reasonable accommoda-
tions to alcoholics is pro-employee, requiring employers to undertake a
number of steps before terminating alcoholic employees. But courts have
not interpreted this framework to lay the burden of unlimited tolerance
on the employer, as indicated in the following sections.
2. Limitations on an Employer's Duty to Reasonably Accommodate
Alcoholics
a. Employers Do Not Have to Condone Criminal Behavior:
Hinnershitz v. Ortep of Pennsylvania, Inc.
In Hinnershitz v. Ortep of Pennsylvania, Inc.,183 the plaintiff was an oil
truck driver and oil burner cleaner. 184 The plaintiff voluntarily admitted
that he suffered from alcoholism, and he requested permission from his
employer, Ortep, to participate in a nineteen-day in-patient treatment
program for alcohol abuse.1 85 After he completed the program, the pro-
gram director advised the plaintiff and his employer that the plaintiff
should continue to attend both counseling sessions and Alcoholics Anon-
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See Rogers, 869 F.2d at 254. Rodgers was given leave to attend an inpatient treat-
ment program, but he was terminated for conduct prior to entering the program. See id. at
256. The court deemed that he was not afforded the proper opportunity to undergo inpa-
tient treatment prior to his discharge. See id. at 254.
178. See id. at 259.
179. See id. at 260.
180. 119 F.3d 305.
181. See id. at 312.
182. See id. at 311.
183. 1998 WL 962096 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 1998).




ymous meetings at least four times a week.' 86 The plaintiff disagreed
with the director's assessment, deemed both follow-up measures unneces-
sary, and chose not to comply with the director's recommendations. 87
During the time that Ortep employed the plaintiff, there was never any
evidence that he either drove an oil truck while intoxicated or that he
drank alcohol during working hours. 188 But as the court in Hinnershitz
reasoned, under the Code of Federal Regulations ("C.F.R") pertaining to
qualifications of drivers, a person cannot be considered physically quali-
fied to drive a commercial vehicle, such as a fuel oil truck, if the person is
currently clinically diagnosed as an alcoholic. 189 Furthermore, the C.F.R.
prohibits an employer from allowing an unqualified person to drive a
commercial vehicle.' 90 And if a disease (such as alcoholism) has im-
paired a driver's ability, then the C.F.R. requires that he be physically
examined and certified as physically qualified to operate a commercial
motor vehicle."' 19
In contrast to the Hinnershitz court's reasoning, the court in Wilson v.
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority'92 refused to even
acknowledge C.F.R regulations pertaining to drivers of public transporta-
tion for purposes of an ADA analysis. The Wilson court reasoned that
"Congress significantly did not exclude alcoholics from ADA protection
as it did current illegal drug users."'1 93 When drafting the ADA, Congress
specifically excluded employees currently using illegal drugs from the
ADA's protection, citing current drug users as an exception to those con-
sidered to be otherwise qualified individuals with disabilities. 194 There-
fore, the Wilson court reasoned, because Congress explicitly chose not to
exclude alcoholics from the statute's coverage, the C.F.R. regulations
governing the operators of public transport vehicles should not apply to
actions brought by alcoholics under the ADA.195 The court's reasoning
in Wilson was made even bolder because the plaintiff in this case was a
driver of public transportation, not merely a commercial vehicle.
Even though the plaintiff in Hinnershitz had successfully completed a
nineteen-day, in-patient drug rehabilitation program, the defendant con-
tended that in order to avoid having a "current clinical diagnosis of alco-
holism," the plaintiff had to attend both the counseling sessions and the
Alcoholics Anonymous support group meetings prescribed by the reha-
bilitation program director.' 96 The defendant further argued that its offer
to allow the plaintiff to attend the rehabilitation program and to attend
186. See id. at *2.
187. See id.
188. See id, 1998 WL 962096, at *1.
189. See 49 C.F.R. § 391.41(b)(13) (1998); 1998 WL 962096, at *4.
190. See 49 C.F.R. § 391.11(a) (1998); 1998 WL 962096, at *4.
191. See 49 C.F.R. § 391.45(c) (1998); 1998 WL 962096, at *4.
192. See 1999 WL 58657, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 1999).
193. See 1998 WL 58657, at *4; 42 U.S.C. § 12114(a) (1994);
194. See 42 U.S.C. § 12114(a).
195. See 1999 WL 58657, at *1.
196. See 1998 WL 962096, at *5.
[Vol. 542172
ALCOHOLISM AND THE ADA
the counseling sessions and AA meetings were reasonable accommoda-
tions of the plaintiff's disability. 197 The court agreed with the defendant,
citing Aka v. Washington Hosp. Center'98 for the proposition that an em-
ployer is only required to provide the employee with a reasonable accom-
modation, which may not necessarily be the accommodation that the
employee prefers.199 "An employee cannot use the ADA to compel an
employer to offer a particular reasonable accommodation. '200 "The em-
ployer providing the accommodation has the ultimate discretion to
choose between effective accommodations and may choose the less ex-
pensive accommodation or the accommodation that is easier for it to pro-
vide. '20 1 "A plaintiff has no right to make the employer provide a
particular accommodation 'if another reasonable accommodation is in-
stead provided." 202 In essence, the Hinnershnitz court's decision implies
that, because the employer provided the plaintiff time to attend the coun-
seling sessions and "meetings, the plaintiff had to accept the accommoda-
tions and could not choose to do otherwise."
Additionally, because the plaintiff in Hinnershitz had no contrary evi-
dence on the issues of whether he needed to attend counseling and AA
sessions except his own self-judgment, he could not produce sufficient
evidence to get past the defendant's motion for summary judgment.20 3
The defendant had articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
the plaintiff's discharge: his refusal to complete prescribed outpatient
treatment and his refusal to cooperate in efforts to decide whether an
alternative type of treatment was a viable option.20 4 And the plaintiff
offered no evidence that the defendant's asserted reasons were
pretextual.205
The plaintiff in Hinnershitz had never done anything to show that he
was unqualified to perform the essential functions of his job. Nor had he
ever, even allegedly, been under the influence of alcohol during working
hours. Nevertheless, he was prohibited from even going beyond the sum-
mary judgment stage in an action against his employer who discharged
him because of his alcoholism.
197. See id.
198. 156 F.3d 1284, 1305 (D.C. Cir. 1998), quoting Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 95 F.3d
492, 498 (7th Cir. 1996).
199. 1998 WL 962096 at *5;
200. Turner v. Fleming Cos., Inc., 1999 WL 68580, at*5 (6th Cir. Jan. 21, 1999) (holding
that the plaintiff could not hold out for the accommodation he preferred when the em-
ployer had already reasonably accommodated him by allowing him to leave work during
the day to attend counseling sessions).
201. Hankins v. The Gap, Inc., 84 F.3d 797, 800-01 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting 29 CFR
§ 1630, app. § 1630.9 (interpretive guidance accompanying ADA regulations).
202. Turner v. Fleming Cos., Inc., 1999 WL 68580, at *5 (quoting Hankins, 84 F.3d at
800-01.





b. Employers Do Not Have to Condone Absenteeism, Even if it is
Related to the Employee's Alcoholism
In addition to holding that employers do not have to make concessions
where criminal behavior is involved, courts have interpreted the ADA to
provide even more leeway for employers. One example of this is the
courts' leniency on employers who discriminate against employees who
have problems with absenteeism, even if the problems are related to their
alcoholism. 2 0 6 Whether employees can establish that an employer dis-
criminated against them because of absenteeism caused by their alcohol-
ism may depend on the reasons for their absences. There are certain
valid reasons to be absent, such as current participation in a supervised
rehabilitation program or attendance at alcoholics anonymous meet-
ings,20 7 and there are invalid reasons, such as being hung over from a
night of heavy binge drinking. Both are causally related to employees'
alcoholism, but while an employer may not usually discriminate against
absent employees in a supervised rehabilitation program, it may discrimi-
nate against employees for being absent due to other alcohol-related
causes.
3. Leave of Absence
A request by an alcoholic employee for an unpaid leave of absence to
attend a treatment program is often considered a request for reasonable
accommodation.20 8 In Schmidt v. Safeway,2 09 the plaintiff, a truck driver
for Safeway, filed suit against his former employer, alleging that Safeway
failed to reasonably accommodate him when it refused to give him an
unpaid leave of absence to obtain treatment for his alcoholism.210 The
court agreed with the plaintiff, stating "[A] leave of absence to obtain
medical treatment is a reasonable accommodation if it is likely that, fol-
lowing treatment, [the] plaintiff would have been able to safely perform
his duties as a truck driver. '21' But the court made it clear that an em-
ployer would not be required to offer any accommodation that is likely to
be futile.21 2 The court explained that the futility of the accommodation
would mean that the employee would not be able to "safely and effi-
ciently" perform the essential functions of the job and so would not be
206. See, e.g., Teahan v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 951 F.2d 511,517 (2nd Cir. 1991)(holding that adverse action taken in response to absenteeism caused by a disability is
action taken because of the disability).
207. Persons are considered disabled under the ADA while participating in a super-
vised rehabilitation program as long as they are no longer using the substance. See 42
U.S.C. § 12114(b)(2).
208. See Schmidt v. Safeway, 864 F. Supp. 991, 997 (D. Or. 1994) (holding that the
employer's refusal to allow the employee to take a leave of absence to obtain treatment
was unreasonable in light of the fact that the employer's Medical Review Officer recom-
mended the leave and where there was no evidence that the leave would impose an undue
hardship on the employer).
209. 864 F. Supp. 991 (D. Or. 1994).
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considered qualified under the ADA.2 13 Thus, an employer would not be
required to provide repeated leaves of absence (or perhaps even a single
leave of absence for an alcoholic employee with a poor prognosis for
recovery). 214
4. How Company Policies on Absenteeism Can Affect an Alcoholic
Who Requests a leave of Absence
Alcoholics may need to be reasonably accommodated by obtaining
permission to leave work for extended time periods to attend inpatient
programs, or for short time periods to attend outpatient meetings, coun-
seling sessions, and AA meetings. Such absences from work can cause
serious problems for alcoholics who work in environments with strict ab-
senteeism policies.
a. Personal Contact: Turner v. Fleming
One example of such a restrictive absenteeism policy is the "personal
contact" requirement many companies have. In Turner v. Fleming Cos.,
Inc.,215 the employer required employees to make "personal contact"
with the employer in order to obtain permission before being absent from
work.216 Turner, the plaintiff, worked in what his employer classified as
an "unskilled" position B loading milk onto trucks. 217 Turner had never
had trouble on the job before, and his supervisor referred him to as his
"best loader. '2 18 Before he requested a leave of absence to attend an
inpatient alcohol rehabilitation program, he worked the second shift pri-
marily and occasionally helped out on the first shift.219
Turner had completed an inpatient rehabilitation program for his alco-
holism, and he was attending an outpatient treatment program.220 He
made personal contact with his employer by calling him to request that he
be able to work the first shift, because he needed to attend his outpatient
rehabilitation meetings four days a week in the afternoon.221 Without
checking on availability of openings in the first shift, his supervisor de-
nied his request and told Turner that there were no available positions on
the first shift. 222 The supervisor offered to allow Turner to attend the
outpatient meetings in the afternoon during his shift. But he told Turner
that he would only allow him fifteen minutes travel time to the meet-
213. See id.
214. Id. See also Holmes v. Willamette University, 971 P.2d 914, 919 (Ct. App. Or.
1998) (holding that, in order to obtain summary judgment, the employer had to introduce
evidence that undue hardship would result if they allowed the employee, a law professor,
to take a year of unpaid leave to obtain treatment).










ings.22 3 Turner thought the allotted travel time was inadequate, so he
faxed his supervisor, informing him that the proposed accommodations
were not acceptable to him and stated in the fax that he awaited a re-
ply.22 4 His supervisor did not reply, and Turner did not show up at
work.22 5 The employer then fired Turner for failing to make "personal
contact" in compliance with company policy.22 6
In analyzing Turner's claim against his former employer, the Sixth Cir-
cuit held that his violation of the employer's "personal contact" policy
was a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason to fire the plaintiff.22 7 The
court held that the two faxes the plaintiff sent were not personal contact,
even though the plaintiff requested a reply, stating that the company pol-
icy placed the burden of proof on the plaintiff to show personal
contact.228
Turner was left with little recourse. He did not believe that he could
get to and from his meetings in fifteen minutes during the second shift,
and his employer would not allow him to work during the first shift.
While trying to establish a way for his accommodation to work, he estab-
lished a way for his employer to legitimately discharge him.
b. "Consecutive Absence" Policies
Another company policy that provides employers with a legitimate rea-
son to terminate alcoholic employees for absenteeism is the "consecutive
absence" policy. Many employers have "consecutive absence" policies,
whereby an employer will automatically terminate an employee with a
certain number of consecutive unauthorized absences from work.229 In
Brown v. Lucky Stores, Inc.,230 Lucky Stores, Inc. ("Lucky") employed
Brown as a checker. Brown was arrested for driving under the influence
of alcohol ("DUI") and was immediately taken to a mandatory rehabili-
tation program by the police.2 31 Lucky then fired Brown for non-compli-
ance with its "unauthorized absence" policy.2 32 The court held that
Lucky legitimately terminated Brown under its absenteeism policy, which
called for automatic termination for three unauthorized absences. 233 This
rule was applied even though the absences were related to a DUI viola-
tion that was, at least in part, caused by the plaintiff's alcoholism. The
plaintiff missed her third shift while in a court mandated 24-hour-a-day







229. See, e.g. Brown v. Lucky Stores, No. C98-00122, 1999 WL 66138 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8,
1999)
230. Id.
231. See id. at *1.
232. See id.
233. See id. at *4.
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the plaintiff missed her shift because she "had committed several crimes,
not because she was an alcoholic. '234
Such an analysis seems to violate the spirit of the ADA. Alcoholism
can be a disability under the ADA, and employers can be forced to rea-
sonably accommodate alcoholic employees under the ADA by giving
them leave to participate in rehabilitation programs. But if an employee
is placed in a mandatory rehabilitation program by the state because of
actions in part caused by the alcoholism, then the employer is free to
terminate the employee for violation of company absenteeism policy.
c. Employers May Terminate Alcoholic Employees for Engaging in
Egregious Misconduct, Even if Such Conduct is Caused
by the Alcoholism
Another hurdle alcoholic plaintiffs face when suing under the ADA, is
that if they engage in egregious misconduct, even if it is causally related
to their alcoholism, employers may legitimately terminate them.
235
"Even assuming an impairment, real or perceived, the ADA does not im-
munize employees from terminations based on misconduct in the work-
place. '236 The protections provided by the ADA do not extend to the
misconduct of the disabled individual, so an alcoholic employee is unable
to protect himself under the ADA's umbrella, even when his conduct is
related to the alcoholism. 237 A case previously referred to, Rollison,
2 38
illustrates this point.239 The police officer in Rollison was discharged be-
cause of his egregious off-duty behavior.2 40 The employer's decision in
Rollison was legitimate under the ADA, both because the police officer's
actions fell below the standard of behavior required of other officers in
the county and because his alcoholism could not excuse his behavior, in-
cluding the traffic violation.241
Courts analyzing ADA claims agree that discharging individuals for un-
acceptable misconduct is not the same as discharging them because of
their disability, even when the disability leads to the misconduct.
2 42
234. See id. at 3.
235. See 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(4) (even if unsatisfactory performance or behavior is re-
lated to drug use or alcoholism, employer may hold employee to its regular workplace
standards of conduct).
236. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(4). See also Conley, 1999 WL 412441 at *3 (holding that the
employer could legitimately demote the plaintiff from driving a city vehicle to painting the
pump room after he previously arrived at work with alcohol on his breath).
237. See, e.g., Maddox v. University of Tenn., 62 F.3d 843, 848-49 (6th Cir. 1993) (hold-
ing that the employer's adverse employment action was justified when the plaintiff football
coach was fired for his off-duty DWI arrest, which was caused by his alcoholism).
238. 865 F. Supp. 1564 (N.D. Ga. 1994).
239. See id. at 1572.
240. See id. at 1568-69.
241. See id.
242. The Sixth Circuit in Maddox made this argument, relying on the provision in 42
U.S.C. § 12114(c)(4) allowing employers to hold all employees, including disabled employ-
ees, to the same standards. See 62 F.3d at 846. See also Conley, 1999 WL 412441 at *3
(holding that employer's choice to demote the plaintiff was justified when the plaintiff was
caught with alcohol on his breath at work).
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Courts have further emphasized that no employer has to tolerate employ-
ees that work while intoxicated. 243 In Murphy v. Village of Hoffman Es-
tates,244 the court stated that "there is nothing improper about an
employer, especially one whose employees publicly operate heavy and
dangerous equipment, expressing a policy against its employees working
while intoxicated.245 Nothing in the ADA sanctions an employer for re-
quiring its employees not to work while intoxicated. '246 The court in
Murphy went further to make the distinction that "discipline due to mis-
conduct, working while intoxicated, is not necessarily synonymous with
discipline due to a disability, even if the misconduct stems from an alco-
hol-related disability. '247
Thus, there are many different caveats that allow employers to ignore
any duty to accommodate and terminate the alcoholic employee, includ-
ing non-compliance with company absenteeism policies and egregious be-
havior. And these reasons are still legitimate, even if the employee's
behavior is causally related to his alcoholism.
II. THE VOLITIONAL ASPECT OF ALCOHOLISM
This section will examine the controversy surrounding alcoholism and
whether it should in fact qualify as a disability in the first place because
people, alcoholic or not, make a choice each and every time they drink.
The center of this controversy, and the reason that alcoholism is not
treated similarly to other disabilities covered by the ADA, is that reason-
able persons continue to disagree as to both the origin of alcoholism, and
the degree of volition involved. Take the following example:
Sam, an alcoholic, gets up every morning and mixes vodka with his
coffee. He chooses vodka because he knows it is the easiest to conceal.
The coffee masks the faint odor of alcohol on his breath. The thought of
drinking his coffee without the vodka does not occur to him. He tried it
before, a long time ago, but he got the shakes so badly that he could not
concentrate on anything at work, and his head was pounding all day, until
he went home at lunch and had a drink. Sam drinks his vodka and coffee
throughout the morning, working all the while. He has never been in
trouble at work, never had any complaints about his performance and he
has been doing this for fifteen years.
All of the courts agree that should Sam's employer ever discover that
he has been drinking on the job, the employer has every right to fire him
immediately, no employer has to tolerate drinking on the job.248 But how
is this result a fair one, if alcoholism is a disability, if it is a disease that
Sam cannot control? It is in this question that the controversy lies, be-
243. See, e.g., Murphy v. Viii. of Hoffman Estates, 1999 WL 160305, at * 3 (ND. I11. Jan.
19, 1999).
244. No. 95CS1 92, 1999 WL 16035 (N.D. I11. Mar. 17, 1999).
245. See id. at *3.
246. See id.
247. See id.
248. See, e.g., id.
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cause while alcoholism has been repeatedly recognized as a disease,2 49 it
was Sam's choice to take the first drink.
A. THE DISEASE MODEL OF ALCOHOLISM
The controversy over the applicability of the ADA to alcoholism cen-
ters on the disagreement over whether alcoholism should be character-
ized as a disease or as a choice. Since it's inception in 1953, the American
Psychiatric Association has included alcoholism in each new addition of
its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.250 Addition-
ally, both the National Council on Alcoholism and the American Medical
Society on Alcoholism have agreed on the following definition of alcohol-
ism: "Alcoholism is a chronic, progressive, and potentially fatal disease.
It is characterized by tolerance and physical dependency or pathologic
organ changes, or both-all the direct or indirect consequences of the
alcohol ingested. '251
Those who dispute the disease model of alcoholism call it a mere "use-
ful fiction" designed to relieve alcoholics of responsibility for their ac-
tions. 252 To agree with the disease model, opponents argue, is to
completely ignore the volitional aspect of alcoholism, in that an alcoholic
must choose to take the first drink.253
In 1971, Supreme Court Chief Justice Marshall noted in Powell v.
Texas, 254 that the medical profession could not decide within itself
whether alcohol is physically "'addicting' or merely psychologically
'habituating.' "255
In recent years, courts have concluded that there is significant support
for the proposition that alcoholism is a disease," 256 recognizing the
"shame which we have associated with alcoholism," 257 and have sought to
replace "reflexive reactions" with "actions based on reasoned and medi-
cally sound judgments. ' 258
249. See, e.g. AM. Psychiatric Assoc., Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Dis-
orders. The current edition is the DSM-IV.
250. See id.
251. See AM. Psychiatric Assoc., Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disor-
ders. The current edition is the DSM-IV.
252. Wright, Alcohol and Free Will, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 14, 1987, at 14, 16.
253. See Fingarette, The Perils of Powell: In Search of a Factual Foundation for the
"Disease Concept of Alcoholism," 83 HARV. L. REV. 793, 802-08 (1970) (discussing disease
concept's disregard for the volitional element of alcoholism).
254. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
255. See id. at 518.
256. See Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 550-551 (1988) (acknowledging that there is
a substantial body of medical evidence to support the proposition that alcoholism is a dis-
ease, but stressing the importance of the volitional aspect alcoholism).
257. Powell, 392 U.S. at 531.
258. School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 285 (1987).
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III. SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE
DISPARATE TREATMENT OF ALCOHOLISM
UNDER THE ADA
A. CONGRESS SHOULD CLARIFY WHAT QUALIFIES AS A
"SUBSTANTIALLY LIMITING" DISABILITY
The drafters of the ADA inadvertently created a problem with assess-
ing disabilities under the act because there are no set criteria for making
the assessment. While a disability must substantially impair the individ-
ual in a major life activity, it is completely up to the court's discretion to
decide what exactly is "substantial." There need to be more objective cri-
teria to guide the courts as to what is substantial, especially for the alco-
holic plaintiff. A prime example of this is Burch.259 Recall that in Burch,
even though the plaintiff showed that when he drank too much he had
difficulty walking, talking, and sleeping, and that he had memory-impair-
ing hangovers the next morning, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals char-
acterized his symptoms as temporarily incapacitating, and therefore not
substantially limiting. 260 The court in Burch focused on the permanency
of the impairment, but even though the effects of the alcohol were tem-
porary, they were occurring repeatedly, on what possibly could have been
a permanent basis. 26 1
Additionally, while the EEOC guidelines provide that working is a ma-
jor life activity, an alcoholic has the "burden of proving that his alcohol-
ism did not affect his job and that he was performing to the same
standard as other employees. ' 262 Thus, while persons with other disabili-
ties can claim that they are substantially limited in the major life activity
of working, alcoholics essentially cannot.
Congress has already defined "disability," "otherwise qualified," and
"major life activity"; it needs to clarify exactly what "substantial" means.
Alcoholics especially need this certainty, as their condition lends itself to
"temporary" side effects. Thus, if the legislature intends the ADA to ap-
ply to alcoholism, then it needs to explicitly indicate that "temporary"
impairments can be substantial, if they occur persistently. Further, the
burden for showing substantial impairment in a major life activity should
be the same for all individuals bringing claims under the ADA. If alco-
holism is a disability, then someone who has epilepsy should not be al-
lowed to show that he is substantially impaired in the major life activity of
working if someone with alcoholism could not ever prevail on the same
showing.
259. 119 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 1997).
260. See id. at 316.
261. See id.
262. See Conley, 1999 WL 412441, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 10, 1999) (holding that the plain-
tiff, who had repeatedly turned down overtime work and admitted others with less senior-
ity deserved to be promoted over him because of better performance ratings had not
carried his burden).
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B. CONGRESS SHOULD ADOPT THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S FRAMEWORK
FOR REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION OF
ALCOHOLIC EMPLOYEES
Another problem for alcoholic plaintiffs is that there is divergence
among the courts as to the employers' duty to reasonably accommodate
alcoholic employees who are otherwise qualified for the job. In order to
clarify and provide uniformity for alcoholics under the ADA, Congress
should adopt the framework provided in the Fourth Circuit case Rogers v.
Lehman.263 Recall that under the Rogers framework, the employer is re-
quired to:
1. inform the employee of available counseling services as soon as a
problem is recognized,
2. provide the employee with a firm choice between treatment and
discipline,
3. provide an opportunity for outpatient treatment, with discipline
for continued misconduct; and
4. afford an opportunity for inpatient treatment if outpatient treat-
ment fails. 264
Employers adhering to this framework achieve a number of goals.
First, the problem is recognized and dealt with as soon as it occurs. Em-
ployers are not allowed to wait until the problem reaches the level of
"egregious conduct" and simply terminate the alcoholic. Second, the plan
puts the responsibility on the plaintiffs. There is a volitional aspect to
alcoholism, and forcing the alcoholics to make a choice assures that this
aspect is not ignored. They must choose between treatment and disci-
pline and live with the consequences of their choice. Third, by providing
an opportunity for outpatient treatment as a starting point, alcoholics
who may not need to be hospitalized are allowed the opportunity to seek
treatment for their disease without being forced to leave their homes and
families and sources of emotional support. Fourth, by forcing employers
to allow alcoholics to participate in in-patient treatment if outpatient
treatment fails, the plan gives credence to the seriousness of alcoholism
as a disease-one that may not be easily curable; one that may indeed
require hospitalization before it is effectively cured. Finally, the frame-
work provided in Rogers prevents many of the issues that arise when al-
coholics are fired because of problems related to their alcoholism, such as
absenteeism.
IV. CONCLUSION
Since the inception of the ADA, courts have treated alcoholics less fa-
vorably than other disabled persons seeking recovery under the act. Al-
coholics bear a heavier burden in establishing that their disability is
substantially limiting, in proving that they are "otherwise qualified," and
263. 868 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1989).
264. See id.
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in receiving reasonable accommodations from their employers. Both the
EEOC and federal courts alike have recognized that alcoholism is a po-
tentially disabling impairment. Thus, in order to effectuate equal treat-
ment of alcoholism as a disability, it is necessary for Congress to lay out
specific requirements as to what qualifies as "substantially limiting" and
adopt a uniform framework for all employers to follow when working
with alcoholic employees. These measures will assure that alcoholics are
treated similarly to other disabled persons under the act, and will help
achieve the purpose of the ADA, which is to provide reasonable accom-
modations to disabled persons to that they can work and function in our
society.
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